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This thesis analyses the synergy among components of the joint conventional 
strike force in order to determine the most effective force structure. The analysis 
begins by constructing a conceptual model of military decision behavior within the 
context of force structure decisions, using the two primary roles of the military, 
deterrence and warfighting. From the model, synergistic relationships are identified 
which are later exploited. The joint force components used in the analysis are aircraft 
carriers, surface combatants with Tomahawk cruise missiles, and long-range bombers. 
Procurement and operating costs are estimated for the individual components, then 
combined into three equal-cost joint forces with varying numbers of naval groups and 
bombers. A qualitative assessment of the ability of each joint force to deter conflict 
is made. Then, using a stylized scenario, the analysis quantifies warfighting 
effectiveness, both with and without considering attrition. However, total 
effectiveness is not a simple additive solution of deterrence and warfighting. The 
effects of synergy also must be weighed. The analysis concludes that a balanced joint 
force structure of both naval groups and bombers produces the greatest effectiveness. 
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With the Cold War ended, the U.S. has lost a well-defined enemy in the Soviet Union. 
Regional conflicts are the bane of peace in the foreseeable future. In this new environment, 
the military services have each been aggressively defining their respective roles and missions. 
In support of this, several recent studies have examined the future of air power, particularly 
naval aircraft and long-range bombers. However, with joint operations becoming a peacetime 
role in addition to its traditional role in war, solidarity is crucial. Rather than focusing on 
differences between weapons systems, attention should be directed toward the synergy among 
forces, how they can be used more effectively together. This synergy needs to be analyzed 
with consideration for the roles and objectives of the entire military structure. 
The military has two primary roles, deterrence of aggression and winning wars when 
deterrence fails. Deterrence significantly depends on forces visibly present in a region, notably 
naval forces. Winning wars requires a military that can respond rapidly and project sufficient 
strength against an aggressor. With a budget constraint, the nation cannot build a military 
structure that maximizes the effectiveness of each role. Instead, some reduction in 
effectiveness with respect to each role must be accepted, while relying on synergistic effects 
among force components that increase total force effectiveness. 
Synergy among military forces exists on two levels, strategic and tactical. 
Strategically, deployed naval forces engaged in presence act as a visible representation of all 
military forces. Likewise, warfighting effectiveness acts as a force multiplier in improving 
deterrence effectiveness. Tactical synergy comes in many flavors. Deployed forces form the 
leading edge of rapid response forces. Further, military components, in their operating 
methods, increase warfighting effectiveness beyond what each individual component could 
do alone. In force structure decisions, simply making tradeoffs of weapons systems is not 
sufficient. The military must also capture the synergistic effects. 
We analyzed the deterrence and warfighting effectiveness for the joint conventional 
strike force, the components of which are aircraft carriers and their airwings, naval 
combatants with Tomahawk missiles, and long-range bombers. The procurement and 
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operating costs of the individual elements were estimated, then assembled into three joint 
forces of equal cost. The three carrier quantities used are 14, 10 and 6. As the quantity of 
carriers decreases, more bombers are acquired. 
For each joint force, we subjectively assessed deterrence effectiveness. We conclude 
that as the number of carriers declines, deterrence effectiveness diminishes. However, 
warfighting effectiveness may increase, offsetting the loss in deterrence. 
Warfighting effectiveness was quantified using a scenario based in Southwest Asia. 
Force effectiveness was calculated both with and without attrition to U.S. forces. 
Effectiveness was measured by the number of targets destroyed, and the number of aircraft 
sorties. The latter measure of effectiveness is a proxy for the responsiveness and coverage of 
targets by strike assets. Carrier aircraft were shown to be far more effective in producing 
sorties, while bombers hold the edge in number of targets destroyed. Deciding on which force 
structure has more warfighting effectiveness depends on which measure holds more 
importance. However, there is more than a tradeoff between deterrence and warfighting. The 
effects on synergy also must be considered 
A joint force structure with an emphasis on carriers has the best deterrence. But its 
warfighting effectiveness declines because sufficient bombers do not exist to destroy a large 
number of targets quickly. Expecting carrier aircraft to accomplish this mission exposes them 
to significant attrition risks. Placing a heavy reliance on bombers results in some loss in 
deterrence, but a significant number of targets can be hit very quickly. However, the bombers 
also are exposed to attrition risks due to the reduction in strike support provided by carriers. 
Therefore, we conclude that a balanced force, with a sufficient number of bombers and 




In the final analysis, our armed forces must be prepared to respond rapidly, to 
deter, and, if necessary, to fight and win... {National Security Strategy, 
1993). 
The Cold War symbolically ended with the destruction of the Berlin Wall. As has been 
the case after every war, debate is centered on the size and shape of the future military forces. 
The threat of major war is greatly diminished, allowing for a smaller number of forces. 
However, without the threat of Soviet domination, ethnic and racial hatred has been released. 
Regional conflicts are the bane of peace in the foreseeable future. Without a well defined 
enemy, the services have each been aggressively defining their respective roles and missions 
in the new defense posture. To add to the clutter, the Department of Defense now emphasizes 
jointness in both warfare and peacetime planning. 
Defense of our nation is the fundamental basis for military service and joint 
warfare is indispensable to that defense. The reason for our existence demands 
unity in our efforts. (Powell, 1991, p. 2) 
The most notable debate concerns air power -- land-based tactical aircraft, long-range 
bombers, and naval aircraft. Several studies have been conducted espousing the virtues of 
each. 
In response to a report by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), the Center 
for Naval Analyses (CNA) in December 1991 released an information memorandum 
comparing long-range bombers and naval forces (Perm 1991). The study examined the 
missions of carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and bombers. It concluded that because a CVBG 
has multiple capabilities in both peace and crises, whereas bombers are primarily designed for 
strike warfare, a direct comparison of the two is not possible. However, some comparisons 
can be made between tactical aircraft in the carrier air wing (CVW) and bombers in the 
common mission of strike warfare. Using the proposed A-X aircraft and B-2, equal cost 
forces were assembled. Then, using a variety scenarios, payload delivered was calculated. 




course of a campaign due to its higher sortie rate. The report emphasized aircraft differences 
which, unfortunately, detracted from the more important identification of complementary and 
synergistic relationships. Perin concluded by noting "... the U.S. derives many advantages 
from balanced aviation forces that maintain a degree of tactical and operational 
complementarity " (Perin, p 57). 
On June 17, 1992, Donald Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, testifying before the 
SASC, presented the USAF Bomber Roadmap white paper (Rice, 1992). The Roadmap 
outlines the strengths of the bomber forces and identifies planned upgrades in survivability and 
conventional weapons capabilities for the B-1B, B-2A and B-52H. To demonstrate the 
significance of the upgrades, a hypothetical list of 238 high priority targets to be destroyed 
in the first 5 days of a conflict was identified. These targets broke down into 1250+ aimpoints. 
The bomber force of B-1B and B-52H in 1992 could hit only 300 of the aimpoints. By 2001, 
with the B-2A and improved B-1B and B-52H, all 1250+ aimpoints could be hit in the first 
5 days. By combining the B-2A's stealth with standoff weapons, the highest threat defenses 
can be penetrated, allowing other bombers to strike against low and medium threat defenses. 
Should a second contingency arise, the bomber force has the capability to quickly swing to 
the other theater and strike priority targets until additional forces arrive. The paper states that 
...bombers have inherent strengths no other weapon system can match. Their 
combination of range, payload and flexibility make bombers the theater 
commander's weapon of choice for both crises response and sustained 
operations. (Rice, 1992) 
With joint operations becoming a peacetime role in addition to its traditional role in 
war, solidarity is crucial. Analysis tends to focus on differences between weapons systems, 
and why one is preferred over another. Instead, attention should be directed toward the 
synergy between forces, as Perin recognized but did not explore further. The nation's military 
needs both carriers and bombers. Emphasis needs to be placed not on the capabilities of 
singular assets, but on the objectives of the joint force. 
In this thesis we analyze the tradeoffs between these joint objectives by focusing on 
the joint conventional strike force. In Chapter II, we identify the joint force objectives and 
their contributing factors. From these, a conceptual model of military decision behavior is 
course of a campaign due to its higher sortie rate. The report emphasized aircraft di ferences 
which, unfortunately, detracted fro  the more important identification of complementary and 
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developed. It provides the framework from which comparisons and tradeoffs between 
alternative joint force structures can be drawn. In Chapter III, the components of the joint 
force are described and their costs estimated. Three equal cost joint forces are then 
constructed. Chapter IV calculates the capabilities of each force, from the context of the 
conceptual model of military decision behavior. Finally, Chapter V presents conclusions and 
recommendations for future study. 
3 
4 
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
To begin, we must first define the strategic objectives of the military. The National 
Military Strategy in 1992 stated: 
The fundamental objective of America's armed forces will remain constant: to 
deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital 
interests against any potential foe. Deterrence remains the primary and central 
motivating purpose underlying our national military strategy (p. 6). 
Clearly, the objectives are deterrence and warfighting, with deterrence the more important of 
the two. In order to analyze these objectives we impose a structure on them using concepts 
from probability theory. 
Deterrence is the capability to prevent or discourage some action, in this case war. 
Successful deterrence, therefore, reduces the probability of war, P(War). Defining the factors 
contributing to deterrence generates debate. However, two statements from the National 
Military Strategy provide an answer. 
Over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence of US forces in regions vital 
to US national interests has been key to averting crises and preventing war... 
Although the numbers of US forces stationed overseas will be reduced, the 
credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to 
depend on judicial forward presence (p. 7). 
Forward presence helps to reduce regional tensions, to deter potential 
aggressors, and to dampen regional arms competitions (p. 11). 
Successful deterrence, therefore, relates functionally to forward presence. 
P(War) = f(presence) 
The argument is not that only presence affects P(War), but that military strategy emphasizes 
its importance. Deterrence also depends on the entire structure of foreign relations and on the 
nation's military posture. Presence can take on many forms, from ground forces stationed 
overseas, to routine deployment of naval forces, or periodic training exercises with foreign 
powers. All forms send a signal of U.S. concern and involvement. 
But the physical presence of military forces is not sufficient. They also rely on a 
strategic synergy with forces remaining in the continental U.S. (CONUS). To potential 
aggressors and allies alike, credible forces, visibly present, represent the totality of U.S. forces 
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5 
which can be employed in a crises. However, vulnerable forces, or the absence of forces, 
would be interpreted as the lack of U. S. resolve and provide no deterrence. Admiral Owens 
states, 
In deterrence, however, the issue is what U.S. forces the potential aggressor 
thinks can get there sooner rather than later. Here, the visible proximity of 
deployed credible U.S. forces probably has great effect... Visible military 
presence can, of course, work against our capacity to deter a regional 
predator if, instead of being impressed with the "invulnerability" of the forces 
deployed overseas, the predator sees the forces as easy targets and believes 
the United States sees them as such also (Owens, 1994, p. 31). 
Although fostering peace is the primary objective of the military, when deterrence 
fails, it must be prepared to fight and win. This is the second objective of military forces. 
When a crises erupts, the conditional probability of winning, given that war has occurred, 
P(Win | War), must be significant. The primary functional components of this objective are 
more easily defined. "We must be able to project power... rapidly and in sufficient strength 
to defeat any aggressor who has not been deterred by our forward presence" {National 
Military Strategy, 1992, p. 11). Therefore, 
P(Win | War) = g(response time, strength). 
Together, the two military objectives yield the joint probability of war and winning. 
P(War and Win) - P(War) * P(Win | War) (1) 
However, evaluation of equation (1) is difficult. For example, if P(War) = 0, meaning 
peace is certain (a desirable outcome), then P(War and Win) = 0. Unfortunately, we obtain 
the same answer if P(Win | War) = 0, or certain loss (highly undesirable). Therefore, as shown 
in Figure 1, we use equation (1) to construct a conceptual model of military decision behavior 
and apply utility theory. 
In the figure, a square represents some decision to be made. A circle represents the 
probabilistic outcome ofthat decision. Although the figure depicts two decisions, they are 
related by force structure and occur at the same time. In this model, a military decision maker 
chooses a force structure with some presence characteristics. If peace occurs, the decision 
maker obtains an arbitrarily chosen amount of 100 utils, a measure of utility. The chosen force 
structure also possesses some warfighting qualities. If war erupts, the military either loses, 
 
















yielding 0 utils, or wins, yielding q utils, an unknown level. We can make two assumptions 
about the model. First, the decision maker is rational and prefers winning over losing. He 
cannot earn negative utils from winning a war, therefore q > 0. The second assumption, peace 
is not certain and P(War) > 0. 
Figure 1. Conceptual military decision behavior model. 
We now impose a limited defense budget on the decision maker. The military cannot 
build a force capable of providing both maximum presence and warfighting capabilities, 
relying instead on limited portions of each. The decision maker must chose a force structure 
which maximizes expected utility. 
Max E(Util) - P(Peace)*U(Peace) + P(War)*P(Lose | War)*U(Lose) 
+ P(War)*P(Win | War)*U(Win) 
= P(Peace)* 100 + P(War)*P(Win | War)*q (2) 
The type of force to build now depends on the value of q. If q is sufficiently small, 
then the equation is maximized by focusing on deterrence and maximizing P(Peace). If 
q > 100, then the decision maker would prefer to wage war to peaceful negotiations and 
therefore maximize warfighting potential. If q = 100, the choice is ambiguous. However, q 
is not constant, varying by decision maker and time. Desert Shield/Storm is an example. Iraq 
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7 
began preferring war, with q > 100. Initially, the U.S. preferred negotiations, q < 100, until 
the time deadline arrived, then it too chose war. The challenge for U.S. military decision 
makers, is to build a balanced force structure which recognizes an unknown q. The decision 
requires a recognition of the strategic and tactical synergy between presence forces and 
warfighting forces. Presence forces form the leading edge of the rapid response forces but 
lack sufficient strength to win the war alone. Warfighting forces provide that strength, and 
by increasing P(Win | War), further deters an aggressor. Cost is the limiting factor preventing 
both forces from achieving maximum potential. 
We approach this problem by limiting our analysis to strike warfare in examining 
several joint force structures. A quantitative measurement of deterrence effectiveness is 
difficult, therefore we make a qualitative assessment. Warfighting capability is analyzed 
quantitatively, with a subjective appraisal of its influence on deterrence. 
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III. COST ESTIMATION 
Many elements comprise the joint conventional strike force, nuclear aircraft carriers 
(CVNs) and their airwings (CVWs), naval surface combatants and submarines with 
Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM), Air Force long-range bombers and land-based tactical 
aircraft. To make the analysis manageable and meaningful, the issue of basing must be 
considered. 
Naval forces enjoy freedom of the seas, giving them the ability to operate close to an 
aggressor's shore, with due consideration to their own safety. Although their speed is 
relatively slow, replenishment ships increase the capability to operate at sea for long durations 
and at greater ranges from friendly bases. Aircraft and TLAM provide the ability to project 
power from great distances while avoiding hostile weapons, normally from within hundreds 
of miles of the shore. Long-range bombers, as the name implies, can reach anywhere in the 
world within hours from the CONUS, provided sufficient aerial refueling exists. Large 
payloads makes them efficient over these great distances. With the availability of overseas 
bases, such as Guam or Diego Garcia, round-trip distances to many parts of the globe are 
considerably lessened. Land-based tactical aircraft can also benefit from overseas bases. But 
with their smaller payloads and shorter ranges they become inefficient. Like carrier aircraft, 
they are best used from airfields within hundreds of miles or less from the battle. This requires 
basing in the theater, which, at the outset of hostilities cannot be guaranteed. For this analysis, 
we only want to use forces which can be deployed quickly and fight without relying upon 
theater basing. Therefore, we consider a joint strike force to consist of CVN/CVWs, surface 
combatants with TLAM, and bombers. 
First, we define the specific forces involved, then estimate their procurement and 
operating and support (O&S) costs. All dollar figures have been converted to constant fiscal 
year (FY) 1995 dollars using DOD deflators based on total obligational authority from 
NatiomlDefense Budget Estimates for FY 1994 (1993). The Appendix lists costs by year for 
all forces used and contains more details on the cost components encompassed by 
procurement and O&S categories. 
/
i na  Def t sf
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A. AIR FORCE COMPONENTS 
1. Procurement Costs 
The planned inventory of bombers for the near future includes the B-1B, B-2A and 
B-52H (Rice, 1992). Procurement costs for the B-1B and B-2A are broken out by year in 
U.S. Military Aircraft Data Book (Nicholas, 1977-1994). After converting to constant FY95 
dollars, total dollars spent was averaged over the quantity of aircraft procured. This average 
was then annualized over the planned service life of the aircraft (Hildebrandt, 1985, p. 16), 
yielding an annualized procurement cost per aircraft. This cost, however, is not the annual 
cost to replace an aircraft because it does not account for production rates, learning curves, 
technological changes, and actual service life (Davis, 1993, p. 77). 
The approach taken for the B-52H was different due to a lack of yearly data. Instead, 
an estimate of flyaway cost from Military Cost Handbook (Nicholas, 1994), was used. The 
average ratio of procurement cost to flyaway cost was computed for several aircraft types 
(Nicholas, 1977-1994). This average ratio was multiplied by the B-52H flyaway cost, and 
then annualized over the service life. 
Three terms used to define the quantity of aircraft in inventory are primary aircraft 
authorized (PAA), backup aircraft inventory (BAI), and total aircraft inventory (TAI). PAA 
are those aircraft assigned to a unit for performance of operational missions (AFR 173-13, 
1986, p. 139). BAI includes aircraft used to train new pilots, those used in research and 
development, or undergoing depot-level maintenance TAI is simply PAA plus BAI. It is 
important, when estimating the cost of an aircraft squadron, that the costs associated with 
BAI are captured. Each aircraft's annualized procurement cost was multiplied by TAI and 
then divided by the number of squadrons. The values for B-1B and B-52H TAI are available 
from Ar Force VAMOSC, and number of squadrons is contained in Nicholas (1994). B-2A 
TAI and squadron numbers were provided by Ritchey (1994). 
2. Operating and Support Costs 
B-1B and B-52H O&S costs were derived from Air Force VAMOSC data between 
1990 and 1993. To conform this data to that provided by the Navy, indirect costs associated 











squadrons. We assume O&S costs do not increase over the service life of an aircraft. B-2A 
O&S costs were provided by Ritchey (1994), with no correction made for BOS. Table 1 
summarizes all bomber aircraft inventory and cost data. 
TAI PAA Squadrons Procurement O&S Total 
B-1B 94 84 6 $ 256.934 $   95.878 $ 352.812 
B-2A 20 16 2 667.213 132.500 799.713 
B-52H 94 84 6 63.847 96.561 160.408 
B. NAVAL COMPONENTS 
1. Surface Forces 
We are interested in surface forces which provide strike potential. The CVN-68 class 
is an obvious inclusion. Also, many ship classes carry TLAM. We limit the analysis to those 
ship classes with a vertical launch system (VLS), which are CG-47, DDG-51, and DD-963. 
To provide sustainability to these surface forces, we include an AOE-6 class fast combat 
support ship. 
a. Procurement Costs 
Yearly procurement costs for all surface forces is contained in U.S. Weapon 
Systems Costs (Nicholas, 1977-1994). The average procurement cost per ship in FY 95 
dollars was calculated, then annualized by service life (Hildebrandt, 1985, p. 16). The CVN 
has an additional cost for nuclear refueling and overhaul (Hall, 1994). This cost is included 
in procurement costs. 
b. Operating and Support Costs 
Navy VAMOSC data on ship class averages from 1986 to 1993 was used. The 
data for the CVN-68 and CG-47 classes was used directly. Depot-level maintenance costs for 
the DD-963 are overstated due to a modernization program installing VLS. This cost 
category was adjusted by equating the ratio of DD-963 to CG-47 depot-level costs to the 
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ratio of intermediate-level maintenance costs. The DDG-51 class data contains only two 
observations from 1992 to 1993, with no depot level costs. Its intermediate level costs are 
very low compared to the CG-47 class, therefore, it is given the same amount of depot level 
spending as the DD-963 class. The AOE-6 class is new to the fleet and no cost data for it is 
available. We used O&S data for the AOE-1 class, which is of comparable size and cargo 
capacity. {Jane's, 1994) All ship cost data are contained in Table 2. 
Procurement O&S Total 
CVN-68 $ 176.730 $ 165.551 $ 286.725 
CG-47 42.631 28.017 70.648 
DDG-51 29.893 20.709 50.602 
DD-963 15.059 22.352 37.411 
AOE-6 16.875 38.320 55.195 
Table 2. Annualized cost per ship in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
2. Tomahawk 
The procurement costs for TLAM is from U.S. Missile Data Book (Nicholas, 1994). 
The total procurement dollars spent was averaged over the total missiles bought, and then 
annualized over the service life (Hildebrandt, 1985, p. 16). There is no associated O&S cost. 
The annualized cost per missile, in millions of FY 95 dollars is $ 0.241. The notional number 





Table 3. Notional TLAM carried per ship 
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3. Aircraft 
a. Procurement Costs 
The future CVW contains many of the same types of aircraft as today's, but 
with a greater emphasis on multi-role aircraft. The mix we use combines aspects from Sortie 
Generation Factors (1994) and Navy Carrier Battle Groups (Davis, 1993) and includes the 
F-14D, F/A-18E/F, EA-6B, S-3, E-2C, and SH-60F. Surface combatants also carry 
helicopters, the SH-60B, and replenishment ships use the CH-46 helicopter. Procurement 
costs for all aircraft except the CH-46 are broken out by year in U.S. Military Aircraft Data 
Book (Nicholas, 1977-1994), using the most current aircraft variant. Average procurement 
cost was annualized over the planned service life of the aircraft (Pierrot, 1987, p. 40). 
The approach for the CH-46 was similar to that used for the B-52H, due to 
a lack of yearly data. An estimate of flyaway cost from Military Cost Handbook (Nicholas, 
1994) was used. The average ratio of procurement cost to flyaway cost was computed for 
several helicopter types, applied to the CH-46 flyaway cost, and then annualized over the 
service life. 
To determine TAI, the Navy uses the following formula (Pierrot, 1985, p. 38). 
TAI = PAA + Training + RDT&E + Backup (3) 
where: Training = .25 * PAA 
RDT&E = .03 * PAA + Training 
Backup =.15* PAA + Training + RDT&E 
In Equation 3, the PAA per CVW is used, which yields the TAI needed to support an airwing. 
The annualized procurement cost was multiplied by TAI for the cost per airwing. The SH- 
60B PAA level assumes that each surface combatant carries one helicopter. Each 
replenishment ship operates with two CH-46s. 
b. Operating and Support Costs 
All O&S costs are obtained from Navy VAMOSC data between 1986 and 
1993. The average cost over this time period was divided by the average quantity of aircraft 





     
   
    





TAI PAA Procurement O&S Total 
F-14D 20.73 14 $115,383 $ 37.270 $ 152.654 
F/A-18E/F 53.30 36 150.581 112.468 263.049 
EA-6B 5.92 4 17.973 25.810 43.783 
S-3 11.85 8 21.080 44.288 65.368 
E-2C 5.92 4 25.182 23.317 48.499 
SH-60F 8.88 6 7.754 23.533 31.287 
SH-60B 1.48 1 2.137 3.807 5.944 
CH-46 2.96 2 0.142 23.480 23.622 
Table 4. Annualized aircraft costs in millions of FY 95 dol ars. 
4. Naval Groups 
A great strength of naval forces is their flexibility in forming forces packages to 
counter any threat. Voss (1991) described the structure of several naval force options, and 
their respective strengths and weaknesses. We use two of these groups, a carrier battle group 
(CVBG) and a cruiser task group (CGTG). The CVW consists of the aircraft described 
above. Each surface combatant carries one SH-60B and each AOE has two CH-46. The 
notional number of TLAM per ship is doubled to allow for wartime reserves. Table 5 lists the 
structure of each group and its respective total annualized costs. 
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CG-47 1 1 
DDG-51 2 1 
DD-963 2 1 
AOE-6 1 1 
SH-60B 5 3 
CH-46 2 2 
TLAM 364 212 
Total Cost 1$ 1334.160 $306,321 
Table 5. Naval group components and total annualized cost in millions of FY 95 dollars 
C. JOINT FORCE STRUCTURES 
The joint strike force structure includes the Air Force and Naval components 
described. The number of naval groups remains constant in order to provide an undeviating 
quantity, but not necessarily quality, of presence. Each force has a total of 14 naval groups, 
containing 14, 10, and 6 CVBGs, and 0, 4, an 6 CGTGs, respectively. The number of 
bombers changes with respect to the level of CVBGs. As the number of CVBGs decreases, 
more bomber squadrons are purchased, maintaining an equal cost for all three joint structures. 
This is depicted in Table 6. The number of bomber squadrons in JF2 and the number of C VNs 
are closest to current levels. A consistent change in bombers between forces is maintained. 
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JF1 JF2 JF3 
CVBG 14 10 6 
CGTG 0 4 8 
B-1B 1 6 11 
B-2A 0 2 4 
B-52H 1 6 11 
Total Cost $ 19,191.455 $ 19,245.625 $ 19,299.795 
Table 6. Equal cost joint strike force structures in millions of FY 95 dollars 
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IV. FORCE EFFECTIVENESS 
A. DETERRENCE 
Each of the three joint forces has some deterrence characteristics, which we have 
already defined as significantly dependent on presence. Although bombers can participate in 
presence missions, such as training exercises, naval forces represent the most significant 
contributor. There are two aspects to presence, the quantity and quality of forces. 
The quantity of presence is the number offerees deployed. There are three regions 
where naval forces typically deploy, the Mediterranean Sea (Med), Western Pacific Ocean 
(WestPac), and Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea (10). Each of our joint forces has 14 naval groups. 
We assume a group deploys together to a particular region. With these 14 naval groups, the 
maximum level of presence which can be maintained each year is 12 months in the 
Mediterranean, 12 months in the Western Pacific, and 11 months to the Indian Ocean, for a 
total annual presence of 97 percent (Davis, 1993, p. 25). Presence levels are based on 
traditional deployment lengths, and maintenance and training cycles during the 
interdeployment period. Different deployment patterns are possible, but result in a decreased 
total annual presence percentage. Ignoring the type of naval group deployed, each joint force 
is equally capable of showing the flag. 
The quality of forces present, however, is a necessary concern. Quality is a relative 
measure, and depends on the threat from adversarial forces. Not all regions or nations have 
the same level of threat from an aggressor. Likewise, each naval group has different 
capabilities in countering belligerence. Voss (1991) describes three threat levels, high, medium 
and low. A high-threat nation possesses sophisticated offensive and defensive air, surface, and 
subsurface systems. They represent a significant obstruction to the execution of U.S. 
missions. Medium-threat nations can "impede but not prevent execution of U.S. missions." 
Low-threat nations possess only small arms or engage in terrorist actions (p. 16). Each threat 
level is further divided into the likelihood of crises, high, medium and low. Voss argues that 
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conclude that quality of presence declines as we move from JF1 to JF3. 
B. WARFIGHTING 
1. Scenario 
We analyze warfighting effectiveness using a stylized scenario over a 21 day period. 
The scenario is based in Southwest Asia (SWA) because of few bases from which land-based 
forces can operate and its distance from the CONUS places maximum strain on surging forces 
into the theater. The analysis focuses on the air campaign prior to the introduction of ground 
troops. 
We assume an aggressor launches a short-notice (1 week) attack, or D-day = C+7. 
Deployed naval forces surge into the region at 20 knots on C+0. Naval forces in the CONUS 
deploy on C+2, also at 20 knots. Travel times (Davis, 1993, p. 31) are contained in Table 7. 
The assumed naval group deployment patterns, and groups available to deploy from the 
Atlantic Coast (LANT) and Pacific Coast (PAC) are derived from analysis done by Davis 
(1993), and listed in Table 8. Carrier aircraft used for strike missions are the F/A-18E/F. All 
others provide strike support, such as fighter escort, airborne early warning, and electronic 
jamming, but their contribution to the conflict is not quantitatively analyzed. Strike aircraft 
have a mission capable (MC) rate of 80 percent, and a sortie rate of 2.0 {Sortie Generation 
Factors, 1994). 
Days Days for Stops Total Days 
Med 7 0 7 
WestPac 9 0 9 
LANT 17 1 18 
PAC 24 2 26 
Table 7. Travel time from various regions to SWA at 20 knots. After Davis (1993). 
18 
le s than and including a high threat low likelih od environment (p. 18). Therefore, we can 
conclude that quality of presence declines as we move from JF 1 to JF3. 
B. ARFIGHTING 
1. Scenario 
e analyze warfighting e fectiveness using a stylized scenario over a 21 day period. 
The scenario is based in South est sia (S A) because of fe  bases fro  hich land-based 
forces can operate and its distance fro  the S places axi u  strain on surging forces 
into the theater. he analysis f c ses on the air ca paign prior to the introduction of ground 
troops. 
e ss   r ss r l es  rt- tice (  eek) attack, r -day  . 
l  l r  i t  t  r i  t  ts  O. l f r  i  t e  
  ,    t . l ti  i , , . ) r  t i  i  l  . 
    ,   l l  t  l  t  
          
 I
8 (
ct rs, ). 
I I '!)'  r t t l  
    
est  9   
 17 1 18 
P  24 2 2  
Table 7. Travel ti e fro  various regions to S  at 20 knots. fter avis (1993). 
18 
10 WestPac Med LANT PAC 
JF1 CVBG CVBG CVBG CVBG CVBG 
JF2 CGTG CVBG CVBG CVBG CVBG 
JF3 CGTG CVBG CGTG CGTG CGTG 
Table 8. Naval groups deployed or capable of deploying for scenario. 
Assumptions for the bomber force are drawn from Bowie (1993). In the scenario, 75 
percent of the B-1B force is used, with the remaining 25 percent reserved for strategic 
deterrence. In the week before hostilities, one-third of the B-lBs allocated are moved to an 
overseas base. All B-2A and B-52H are employed. Bombers based in the CONUS, after 
completing their mission, recover at the overseas base to a maximum number of 64. The order 
of precedence for moving bombers overseas is B-1B, B-2A and B-52H. All bombers have a 
MC rate of 85 percent. Sortie rates for CONUS-based bombers are 0.25, for theater-based 
bombers 0.5. 
Ships salvo all TLAM in two days (Bowie, 1993). The CG-47s and DDG-51s remain 
in the theater to provide air protection. All DD-963s rearm, which requires a transit to 
Diego Garcia (4 day transit, 1 day reload, 9 day total turnaround). In order to allow a 
comparison between TLAM and aircraft, all aircraft carry precision munitions (PGMs). The 
B-1B carries 24, B-2A 16, and B-52H 12 PGMs respectively {Conventional Delivery 
Potential, 1993). The F/A-18E/F carries 2 PGMs (Labelle, 1994). 
Table 9 shows the forces present at D+21. Table 10 displays the scenario timeline. 
CVBG CGTG Bombers 
JF1 4 0 21 
JF2 3 1 138 
JF3 1 4 256 
Table 9. Forces employed in SWA scenario at D+21. 
19 
D  estPac ed T P  
JFl      
J       
J       
le . l r s l  r a le f e l i  f r s e ario. 
ti  t  r r  r  fr  ie ( ). I  t e ri ,  
t   -I  , t   i i   r t r r   tr t i  
.    r  tiliti , t ir  f t  I s ll t  r   t   
    . r    , t  
     .  r 
  I ,  .    
      
 . . 









l  . r l  i  t 
19 






Warning of hostilities in SWA 
Deployed naval forces surge to SWA 
CONUS naval groups deploy 
B-lBs move overseas 
Hostilities begin 
Med naval group arrives 
Additional bombers move overseas 
WestPac naval group arrives 
LANT naval group arrives 
Scenario ends 
Table 10. General scenario timeline. 
2. Measures of Effectiveness 
Two measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are used, aimpoints hit and sorties flown. 
Aimpoints hit is a measure of strength, and is used rather than the more traditional tons of 
ordnance delivered due to the use of PGMs, which make it possible to destroy a target with 
only one weapon. However, some targets may cover a wide area, such as a power generation 
station, and therefore several aimpoints within the target area must be hit. Another reason for 
the use of aimpoints is not all PGMs are of the same tonnage. Twice the tonnage may make 
a bigger hole, but only one aimpoint will still be destroyed. 
Unlike aimpoints, sorties are not a final output, but can increase the flexibility of a 
force, and are a good measurement of responsiveness and coverage. An aircraft will typically 
fly a sortie to a single target area, rather than attack several targets widely dispersed. 
Associated with each sortie is a notional payload, and this MOE is a proxy for responsiveness 
and dispersal of payload. The sortie measure therefore captures effectiveness in both time and 
battlespace which is not captured by the aimpoints measure. In essence, aimpoints deals more 
effectively with the mean of combat, or number of targets destroyed, while sorties gauges the 
variance, or the uncertainty and dynamic nature, of combat. 
20 
C-Day I D-Day I Event 
0 arning of hostilities in SWA 
Deployed naval forces surge to S  A 
2 CONUS naval groups deploy 
B-IBs ove overseas 
7 0 ostilities begin 
ed naval group arrives 
dditional bo bers ove overseas 
9 2 st ac naval group arrives 
   al roup rri es 
  i  s 
l  . r l ri  ti li . 




t   fai poi t i  ll t  
 i l , l  i i t ill still t .
li  i i t , s rti  r  t  fi al t t, t  i  t fl i ilit   
force, and are a  eas re e t f res si ss  r .  ir r ft ill t i ll  
fly a sorti  t  a single tar et area, rat r t  att  se er l t r t  i el  dis erse . 
ssociated ith each sortie is a notional payload, and this  is a pr  for responsiveness 
and dispersal of payload. The sortie easure therefore captures effectiveness in both ti e and 
bat lespace which is not captured by the ai points easure. In essence, ai points deals ore 
ef ectively with the mean of combat, or nu ber of targets destroyed, while sorties gauges the 
variance, or the uncertainty and dynamic nature, of combat. 
20 
With the MOEs defined, we can identify the capabilities of the different components 
in the joint force. Two types of CVW are used, CVW-1 and CVW-2. CVW-1 is the standard 
airwing with 36 F/A-18E/F. CVW-2 is an enhanced airwing with 72 F/A-18E/F. With the 
CVW-2 no changes are made to the joint force structure, except for increasing the number 
of strike aircraft on each CVN using existing additional aircraft from non-deployed airwings 
or BAI. Some rearrangement of other aircraft is required on a CVN with CVW-2 attached. 
This may result in some lose in effectiveness in other, non-strike, missions, such as under-sea 
warfare, which we do not consider. Assuming no attrition, Table 11 lists the effectiveness of 
each airwing and bomber squadron. 
Number 
ofa/c 
MC Rate Sortie Rate Sorties/Day PGMs Aimpoints/Day 
CVW-1 36 0.8 2.0 58 2 116 
CVW-2 72 0.8 2.0 115 2 230 


















Table 11. Carrier airwing and bomber squadron daily effectiveness with no attrition. 
3. Data Output Without Attrition 
Without considering attrition to forces employed, we can rather easily calculate the 
effectiveness of each joint force with respect to the MOEs described. TLAM effectiveness is 
included in aimpoints hit, but not in sorties flown, because it is a single shot weapon with no 
reattack capability. Results are listed in Table 12 for a 21 day scenario. 
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Total Aimpoints Hit Total Sorties Flown 
JF1 with CVW-1 13,148 4401 
with CVW-2 21,572 8613 
JF2 with CVW-1 26,844 3991 
with CVW-2 32,716 6927 
JF3 with CVW-1 34,536 2844 
with CVW-2 36,856 4024 
Table 12. Joint force effectiveness with no attrition. 
A readily apparent result is that as the number of bomber squadrons increases, 
aimpoints hit increases, which is to be expected with the bombers large payload. Also, 
doubling the size of a CVW has a significant impact on aimpoints hit, if the data for JF1 alone 
are compared. Finally, the number of aimpoints hit continuously increases from JF1 to JF3 
and with each doubling of the CVW. 
The reverse is true for sorties flown. Decreasing the number of CVNs in the joint 
force decreases sorties flown, due to the higher sortie rate of the CVW. However, sorties 
flown is not continuously decreasing. In fact, sorties flown with JF1 and CVW-1 nearly equals 
sorties flown with JF3 and CVW-2. 
Comparing the buildup of effectiveness as the forces surge into the theater also yields 
some insights. Using the assumptions from before, we calculate daily effectiveness and 
cumulative effectiveness for each component. Figure 2 shows daily aimpoints, Figure 3 
cumulative aimpoints, Figure 4 daily sorties, and Figure 5 cumulative sorties. 
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Figure 4. Daily sorties, no attrition. 
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Figure 5. Cumulative sorties, no attrition. 
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In the figures, CVW-1 and CVW-2 both appear in order to allow comparisons to be 
made. However, each joint force structure has either one or the other, but not both. 
Therefore, when computing totals for each MOE, one type of CVW must be eliminated. 
Figure 2 clearly shows that bombers quickly reach their maximum potential within the 
first few days of the conflict. On the naval side, a significant jump in effectiveness occurs with 
the arrival of a CVN, especially when carrying a CVW-2. Additionally, the daily delivery from 
four CVW-2s in JF1 after D+13 nearly equals the daily delivery from the B-lBs in JF3. The 
B-2A and TLAM both appear to offer little to the campaign in terms of aimpoints alone. 
However, they most certainly would be assigned the most difficult targets, allowing the other 
components to more efficiently attack less heavily defended targets. However, quantifying this 
synergy is beyond the scope of this work. The most notable result from Figure 3 is the rapid 
buildup of cumulative aimpoints from the B-lBs in JF3. The JF1 CVW-2 component also 
shows a significant, although somewhat less, cumulative output. We can conclude from 
Figures 2 and 3 that a bomber force can attack significantly more aimpoints than a force more 
reliant upon naval aircraft. 
Figures 4 and 5, however, clearly show that naval aircraft are more efficient in 
producing sorties, both daily and cumulatively. In JF3, the single CVW-2 generates more 
sorties per day than the entire bomber force combined. 
4. Data Output With Attrition 
a. Attrition Assumptions 
No military force can expect to engage an aggressor without suffering some 
attrition. Some additional assumptions are needed for this. Bombers lost are replaced from 
the CONUS inventory, therefore maintaining the maximum force deployed overseas. Attrition 
loses to naval aircraft, regardless of type of airwing, are replaced at the rate of one standard 
airwing, CVW-1, per week. If less than one airwing is lost, then only the number of aircraft 
lost is replaced. Attrition to strike-support aircraft is not calculated. TLAM also suffer loses. 
Finally, there is no significant threat to naval surface forces. All other assumptions hold. 
We calculate aircraft attrition parametrically with rates of 0.02 and 0.04 per 
sortie. The rates were chosen to obtain a spread of data, with .04 being a plausible upper 
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limit. The argument can be made that not all aircraft, and certainly not the B-2A, will suffer 
the same attrition loses. Also, attrition rates should be expected to differ by target attacked 
and length of campaign. However, the goal is to provide comparisons between joint forces, 
not to predict actual campaign outcome. 
b. Attrition Equation 
Schwartz (1988) provides the attrition equation used. The expected number 
of successful sorties, S, is given by 
S = ^-^[i - (i - vf] 
where: A = number of aircraft 
p = attrition rate per sortie 
R = sorties flown. 
(4) 
The derivation follows from the geometric probability distribution. The 
probability an aircraft flies k successful sorties is p(l-p)k. Summing over all values of k from 
1 to R and then differentiating yields Equation 4 (Schwartz, pp. 3-4). 
c Data Output 
Using equation 4, joint force effectiveness is presented in Table 13 for two 
percent attrition, and in Table 14 for four percent. 
Total Aimpoints Hit Total Sorties Flown 
JF1 with CVW-1 11,719 3978 
with CVW-2 18,619 7534 
JF2 with CVW-1 24,688 3682 
with CVW-2 29,792 6312 
JF3 with CVW-1 32,466 2688 
with CVW-2 34,522 3748 
Table 13. Joint force effectiveness with 2 percent attrition. 
28 
-------- --- ---------------------------------------------. 
li it.  r t    t t t ll ir ,  t t ll 
t   ttriti  l . l , ttriti  r t  t i   t t














I I  
1   
 
1   
  
1  ,   
  ,   
 .  it   t iti . 
 
Total Aimpoints Hit Total Sorties Flown 
JF1 with CVW-1 10,291 3555 
with CVW-2 14,463 5773 
JF2 with CVW-1 22,585 3403 
with CVW-2 26,235 5343 
JF3 with CVW-1 30,357 2543 
with CVW-2 32,107 3473 
Table 14. Joint force effectiveness with 4 percent attrition. 
The results are similar to those obtained with zero attrition, aimpoints hit 
consistently increases as the joint force structure changes from CVWs to bombers, and sorties 
decreases when comparing the same type of CVW. 
As before, examining force effectiveness buildup yields some insights. Figures 
6 through 9 present results for two percent attrition, Figures 10 through 13 show results for 
four percent. 
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Figure 6. Daily aimpoints, 2 percent attrition. 
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Figure 9. Cumulative sorties, 2 percent attrition. 
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Figure 11. Cumulative aimpoints, 4 percent attrition. 
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The Figures reveal that with attrition considerations, bombers have an even 
larger advantage in aimpoints. Low sortie rates prevent bomber inventories from rapidly 
depleting. Carrier aircraft continue to dominate sorties flown, and their ability to replenish 
loses is a great advantage. However, loses begin outpacing the rate of replenishment at four 
percent attrition when three or more CVWs are in operation. 
d Measures of Loss 
We have analyzed the measures of effectiveness for the joint forces, both with 
and without attrition. The conclusions in both conditions are generally in agreement. 
However, attrition results in more than a loss in immediate effectiveness. There is also a loss 
of equipment and people which has long-term implications. Large losses can have a political 
dimension, as the national will begins to erode with increasing attrition. Two measures of loss 
(MOL) are used; the dollar loss of aircraft, measured in annualized procurement cost, and the 
number of crew at risk. Crew size (Nicholas, U.S. Military Aircraft, 1977-1994) for an F/A- 
18E/F, B-1B, B-2A and B-52H is 1, 4, 2, and 6 respectively. Table 15 summarizes the MOLs. 
Attrition Rate 0.02 0.04 
Aircraft 
Lost 
Cost Crew Aircraft 
Lost 
Cost Crew 
JF1 withCVW-1 79 $253 95 138 $436 167 
with CVW-2 149 451 165 225 681 254 
JF2 with CVW-1 73 544 146 124 976 276 
with CVW-2 125 691 198 210 1191 352 
JF3 with CVW-1 55 595 179 101 1072 332 
with CVW-2 76 655 200 137 1173 368 
Table 15. Aircraft lost, annualized procurement cost in millions of FY 95 dollars, and 
number of crew at risk. 
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The number of aircraft lost decreases because of a greater employment of 
bombers with fewer sorties. However, each bomber costs significantly more and carries 
greater crew size, therefore both of those measures increase. 
5. Opportunity Costs 
Associated with each joint force is an opportunity cost of capability foregone. These 
costs are not as easily measured as the MOLs above. However, they are an important 
consideration when analyzing force structure and identifying synergistic relationships. We 
examine opportunity costs much in the same manner as we analyzed force effectiveness, 
beginning with deterrence. 
Even when engaged in a regional conflict, deterring additional conflicts is still a 
significant role of the nation's military, and more specifically a role of naval forces. Although 
deployed forces and forces surged from the CONUS are employed in ending the conflict, 
additional forces must deploy, also from the CONUS, to reconstitute presence. As before, 
these presence forces must be credible in the psyche of other aggressors. This second 
aggressor may recognize the U.S. as entrenched in the first conflict, and therefore unwilling, 
or unable, to respond to a second. Although a CGTG packs an significant punch, a CVBG 
has even more potential and would be the preferred deterrent force if the circumstances 
dictate. Davis (1993) analyzed the surge capabilities of several CVN force levels (p. 32), 
summarized in Table 16. 
CVNs 
Number of carriers deployed or capable of surging at (months) 
0 1 2 3 6 
14 6 8 9 9 12 
10 4 5 8 8 10 
6 1 1 4 4 6 
Table 16. Number of CVNs capable of surging by month and force level. 
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A force level of 14 CVNs (JF1) has a clear edge in reconstituting presence. This force 
is capable of providing four CVBGs to a conflict, and still maintain presence in two other 
regions with a CVBG. JF2, with 10 CVBGs, could also reconstitute a credible presence. JF3, 
however, has only one CVBG available, and it is deployed. It requires another two months 
before additional CVNs can be deployed. An aggressor could potentially view this as a sign 
of weakness. Table 17 shows the number of CVBGs employed in the conflict (assuming only 
those arriving before D+21 are used), the forces deployed to reconstitute presence, and the 
number of CVNs capable of deploying in the future. 
CVBGs 
Employed 
Presence Forces Number of CVNs to surge at 
Med WestPac 1 month 2 months 6 months 
JF1 4 CVBG CVBG 2 1 3 
JF2 3 CGTG CVBG 1 3 2 
JF3 1 CGTG CGTG 0 3 2 
ble 17 . Number of ' CVBGs em oloved in th s scenario a! D+21. fore es denloved 
reconstitute presence, and number of CVNs capable of surging in the future. 
Forces available to swing from the first conflict to a second is another important 
consideration. Consideration must be given to national security objectives in each region when 
deciding which conflict takes precedence, so we limit our discussion to general terms. As 
before, response time is a factor. Bombers can respond rapidly, possibly even using the same 
overseas base for both clashes. Naval groups may require a week or more to arrive, 
depending on the presence posture. Regardless of the type of naval group providing presence, 
surface combatants can provide TLAM. JF1 can provide a significant CVN level to each 
conflict, however the bomber level of effort is already meager, and would unlikely be split 
between two confrontations. A carrier force would most likely have to fight one conflict 
alone, providing only a delaying effort. However, by using CVW-2 its effectiveness, by both 
measures, increases significantly. The second joint force, JF2, is more balanced. Several 
CVNs could be furnished to each conflict, and the bomber forces could also be split as 
40 
 force level f 14 s (JF ) has a clear edge in reconstit ti  prese ce. his force 
is ca l  r i i  f r  t  a c fli t, a  still ai t i  r s  in t  t r 
re i s it  a . J , it  10 s, c l  als  r c stit t  a cre i l  r s . J , 
r,  l   il l ,  it is l . It r ir  t r t  t  
f r  iti l    l .  r r l  t ti ll  i  t i  s  si  
. l    t  r fCV l  i  t  li t ( i  l  
t  rri i   , t f r  l  t r tit ,  t  
 l i  t . 
D  C 10   t  
1 I  
  
1  
Ta l  . p y e t , c p y to 
 
  
         
.    i  , 
 t   i  .  1  i       
i t,     t  ,  li l   lit 
t  t  t ti .  i r  l  t l l   t   li t 
l , r i i  l   l i  ff rt. r,  i  -  its ff ti ss,  t  
r s, i r s s i ifi tl .   j int , , i  r  l . r l 
 s ld e f r i  to  flict,  t e er f r  l  ls  e lit s 
0 
needed. JF3 poses a different obstacle. Bombers available to divide is not an issue. However, 
having only one CVN accessible clearly represents a predicament, due its role in supplying 
strike support, which leads us to our final opportunity cost. 
With exception for the B-2A in some circumstances, bombers require some level of 
strike support, such as fighter escort, airborne early warning, or electronic jamming. Without 
land-based tactical aircraft, this responsibility falls upon the CVN. Undoubtedly, JF1 and JF2 
can fulfill the role, but it is questionable that JF3 would be up to the task. Even more 
dangerously, the first two days of the scenario have the bombers fighting unsupported. For 
this joint force structure, it may be wise to augment support aircraft instead of employing 
CVW-2. However, a second conflict exacerbates the problem. 
6. Tanker Requirements 
Long-legged, bombers flying missions from the CONUS require aerial tanking, and 
we make a rough estimate of those requirements. Nicholas (U.S. Military Aircraft, 1977- 
1994) estimates the fuel capacity and combat range of each bomber, and the fuel capacity of 
the KC-10A aerial tanker, listed in Table 18. 
Fuel (Klbs) Range(nm) Fuel Efficiency (lbs/nm) 
B-1B 193.4 7500 25.79 
B-2A 160.0 7300 21.92 
B-52H 312.8 7500 41.71 
KC-10A 356.1 n/a n/a 
fable 18. A ircraft fuel cap acities, combat ranees, and fuel efficiencies 
After Nicholas (U.S. Military Aircraft, 1977-1994). 
Roundtrip distances from an overseas base to SWA is approximately 6,000 nm, from 
the CONUS is 12,000 nm (Perin, 1991, p. 40). All bombers can complete a mission 
unrefueled from the overseas base, so we can exclude that from our analysis. We then need 
to estimate requirements for aircraft flying CONUS-to-CONUS, and CONUS-to-overseas. 
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CONUS is determined, which is 4500 nm, and then multiplied by fuel efficiency for additional 
pounds of fuel required, or 116,055 lbs. Divided by the capacity of the tanker gives the result 
that a B-1B will require one-third of a KC-10A's capacity to complete a CONUS-to-CONUS 
mission. For a CONUS-to-overseas, the mission distance is 9000 nm, which yields a 
requirement of one-tenth of a KC-10A. Requirements for all bombers is listed in Table 19. 
J CONUS-to-CONUS CONUS-to-overseas 
B-1B   1 .33 .11 
B-2A  | .29 .10 
B-52H| .53 .18 
Table 19. Bomber aerial tanker requirements in KC-10A equiva ents. 
If we assume that bombers prefer to make only one refueling, then the limiting factor 
is the B-52H flying CONUS-to-CONUS, and will require one KC-10A for each B-52H. Any 
other combination of bomber and mission can utilize the excess capacity. Table 20 shows the 
maximum daily sorties for all bombers and mission types. 
JF1 JF2 JF3 
B-1B CONUS-to-CONUS 0 0 9 
CONUS-to-overseas 2 9 16 
B-2A CONUS-to-CONUS n/a 1 7 
CONUS-to-overseas n/a 4 0 
B-52H CONUS-to-CONUS 0 18 33 
CONUS-to-overseas 3 0 0 
Table 20. Maximum daily sorties by bomber and mission type. 
The daily sortie requirement of KC-10As for JF1, JF2, and JF3 is 1, 18, and 33 
respectively. These requirements do not account for refueling of naval aircraft and are rough 
estimates only. 
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C. TOTAL FORCE EFFECTIVENESS 
The conceptual model introduced in Chapter II provides the framework for 
determining total effectiveness of each joint force. To assist in the comparison, the results are 
summarized in Table 21. 
JF1 JF2 JF3           1 
Total CVNs 14 10 6 
Total bombers 28 184 340 
Presence Quantity Equal 
Quality Greatest  > Least 
Warfighting Aimpoints Least <  Greatest 
Sorties Greatest  > Least 
Opportunity 
Costs 
Fulfill presence Greatest  > Least 
Fight two wars Few bombers Best Few CVNs 
Strike Support Greatest  > Least 
Table 21. Summarization of joint force effectiveness. 
None of the joint forces immediately emerges as the best choice. Some loss of 
deterrence occurs from lower quality of presence as the joint force structure moves from JF1 
to JF3. However, a critical consideration is whether any gain in warfighting effectiveness 
contributes sufficiently to improve deterrence. This depends on which warfighting MOE holds 
more importance. We will simply assume that deterrence is maintained among all three joint 
forces. However, opportunity costs play an enormous role. Although we have concluded that 
deterrence is maintained, this is only true for a single conflict. A potential aggressor may 
choose to act if the U.S. were already engaged in another struggle. With this argument, JF1, 
although it reconstitutes presence effectively, lacks strength to fight in two regions. Similarly, 
JF3, although the most capable at destroying the enemy, is vulnerable without strike support. 
Both forces lack the necessary synergy to operate effectively in all situations. 
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Only JF2 appears to fully capture the synergy required. The force structure is 
balanced, such that the components are capable of supporting each other across all levels of 
deterrence and warfighting. This does not suggest that this force structure is the best out of 
all possible candidates, but it is the best choice of the three joint forces analyzed for the 
defense expenditures committed. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The military has two primary roles, deterrence of aggression and winning wars when 
deterrence fails. Deterrence significantly depends on forces visibly present in a region, notably 
naval forces. Winning wars requires a military that can respond rapidly and project sufficient 
strength against an aggressor. With a budget constraint, the nation cannot build a military 
structure that maximizes the effectiveness of each role. Instead, some reduction in 
effectiveness with respect to each role must be accepted, while relying on synergistic effects 
among force components that increase total force effectiveness. 
Synergy among military forces exists on two levels, strategic and tactical. 
Strategically, deployed naval forces engaged in presence represent all military forces. 
Warfighting effectiveness acts as a force multiplier in improving deterrence effectiveness. 
Tactical synergy comes in many flavors. Deployed forces form the leading edge of rapid 
response. Military components, in their operating methods, increase warfighting effectiveness 
beyond what each individual component could do alone. In force structure decisions, simply 
making tradeoffs of weapons systems is not sufficient. The military must also capture the 
synergistic effects. 
We analyzed the changes in deterrence and warfighting effectiveness for the joint 
conventional strike force, the components of which are aircraft carriers and their airwings, 
naval combatants with Tomahawk missiles, and long-range bombers. The components were 
assembled into three equal cost joint forces. 
Deterrence effectiveness decreases as the number of carriers declines. However, 
warfighting effectiveness may improve as more bombers are acquired, offsetting somewhat 
the loss in deterrence. In considering warfighting effectiveness, carrier aircraft were shown 
to be far more effective in producing sorties, a proxy for the responsiveness and coverage of 
targets by strike assets, while bombers hold the edge in number of aimpoints hit. But deciding 
on which force structure to advocate requires more than a tradeoff between deterrence and 
warfighting. The effects on synergy must also be considered. 
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A joint force structure with an emphasis on carriers has the best deterrence. But its 
warfighting effectiveness declines because sufficient bombers do not exist to destroy a large 
number of targets. Expecting primarily carrier aircraft to accomplish this mission may expose 
them to significant attrition risks. Placing a heavy reliance on bombers results in some loss in 
deterrence, but a significant number of targets can be hit quickly. However, the bombers also 
may be exposed to attrition risks due to the reduction in strike support provided by carriers. 
Therefore, total effectiveness is likely to be maximized with a balanced force. 
The continuing argument over carriers versus bombers, therefore, is unproductive. 
The nation's military needs both and should focus its efforts at improving joint operational 
effectiveness. Fryer (1995) provides an excellent description of the immense potential of joint 
operations which were demonstrated in a recent exercise called Kansas Global Lancer. Two 
B-lBs launched from the U.S. to the island of Corsica on a bombing exercise. Naval aircraft 
provided suppression and fighter escort for the mission. More exercises such as this are 
undoubtedly necessary. 
With a shrinking defense budget, force planners need to overcome the urge to 
compare weapons systems. Emphasis needs to be placed on the tradeoffs in joint capabilities, 
and how total effectiveness can be increased. 
B. FUTURE STUDY QUESTIONS 
1. What is the optimal mix of forces for strike warfare9 The contribution of all joint 
strike assets, land and sea-based aircraft, bombers and TLAM, needs to be analyzed. 
Accomplishing this will require a serious examination of the synergy among the forces, 
including strike support, and a determination of the mix that will maximize effectiveness. 
2. Does presence really deter war? The relationship among presence, warfighting and 
foreign policy must be analyzed to determine the relative emphasis that should be given to 
each. 
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APPENDIX. COST CATEGORIES 
This appendix describes the hierarchy of cost categories. Some discussion of O&S 
cost components is presented, along with an alternative O&S model for comparison with 
VAMOSC data. Finally, the cost breakdown for all joint force components is contained in 
Tables 23 through 39. 
Life Cycle Costs (LCC) are the total costs associated with a system over its lifetime. 
It is at the peak of the cost hierarchy, depicted in Figure 14. 
LCC 
(Operating & Support, Industrial Facilities, Common Support Equipment) 
+ 
PROGRAM COSTS 
(Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Military Construction, Ammunition) 
+ 
PROCUREMENT COSTS 
(Initial Spares, Product Improvement) 
+ 
WEAPONS SYSTEM COSTS 
(Data, Ground Support Equipment, Training, Advance Procurement, Peculiar Support) 
+ 
FLYAWAY COST 
(Non-Recurring, Project Management, Test & Evaluation) 
+ 
HARDWARE RECURRING COST 




Figure 14. Cost hierarchy structure. From Nicholas (U.S. Military Aircraft, 1977-1994) 
This cost structure applies to all military systems, although for ships flyaway cost 
becomes sailaway cost. Cost allocation becomes more difficult to determine as we move 
towards the top of the structure. Different systems begin using the same infrastructure, such 











this, cost estimates vary significantly depending on the method of allocation. A good example 
is the treatment of O&S costs. 
The VAMOSC system was established to identify and report historical O&S costs, 
and as a tool for predicting future weapon system O&S costs. The general cost elements 
include personnel, consumables (fuel, ammunition), intermediate maintenance, depot 
maintenance, sustaining investment (spares, modification kits), and indirect support (Generic 
Cost Estimating Guide, 1984). The last element is not uniformly applied among the services. 
Included in indirect support is base operating and support (BOS) costs. The Air Force this 
category while the Navy does not, partially due to the difficulty in allocating costs when ships 
or aircraft are deployed. 
An alternative method of estimating O&S is with the Quick Cost Model used by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (Vassar, 1989). The model costs the changes in Primary 
Defense Forces, e.g. aircraft or ships (p. 3). It has a hierarchical structure which links the 
primary forces to 12 categories of support elements. Changes in a category causes percentage 
changes in all subordinate categories based upon regression analysis conducted by CBO (pp. 
8-10). An advantage of the Quick Cost Model is its applicability to all services. For 
comparison Table 22 lists O&S estimates from VAMOSC and Quick Cost for a CVBG and 
the bomber squadrons. The VAMOSC data does not include BOS, while Quick Cost does 
VAMOSC Quick Cost 
CVBG $629,217 $ 807.022 
B-1B 95.878 148.928 
B-2A 132.500 152.384 
B-52H 96.561 129.025 
mparison of O&S estimates frc jm VAMOSC and Quick Cost 
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Aircraft Bl-B TAI 94 PAA/Squadron         14 




Year Qtv. RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement        O&S 
1981 219.000 347.390 0.000 
1982 l 471.000 707.711 1612.000 2399.343 
1983 7 753.500 1092.222 4033.500 5745.125 
1984 10 737.200 1030.608 6124.500 8440.071 
1985 34 462.500 627.363 7480.700 10000.350 
1986 48 248.400 328.109 4799.400 6215.208 
1987 115.700 148.083 0.000 
1988 366.800 452.416 0.000 
1989 221.600 262.374 0.000 
Totals 100 4996.276 32800.097 




Cost/Squadron 256.934 95.878 
Total Annualized 
Cost/Squadron        352.812 
Table 23. B-1B cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 














Aircraft B-2A TAI 20 
Service Life 20 Squadrons 
Adjusted 
2 
Year Öü RDT&E RDT&E Procurement 
1988 3 13200.000 16281.062 4100.000 
1989 3 2176.500 2576.970 3036.900 
1990 2 1859.700 2117.767 2302.400 
1991 2 1715.700 1885.942 2348.400 
1992 1 1522.300 1638.131 2298.200 
1993 4 1189.300 1243.796 2642.000 
1994 785.800 803.481 756.800 
1995 408.500 408.500 386.700 


























Table 24. B-2A cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
After Nicholas (U.S. Military Aircraft, 1977-1994). 
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Aircraft B-52H TAI 94        PAA/Squadron 
Service Life 20 
Average Average 
Squadrons 6 
Aircraft Frvawav $ Procurements Ratio 
B-2A 901.000 1345.867 1.494 
B-1B 207.000 240.458 1.162 
EA-6B 23.500 36.182 1.540 
E-2C 35.300 44.412 1.258 
F-14D 31.400 72.948 2.323 
F/A-18A-D 21.200 31.873 1.503 Average Ratio 
S-3 11.700 14.400 1.231 1.502 





Cost/Squadron 63.847 96.561 
Total Annualized 
Cost/Squadron 160.408 
Table 25. B-52H cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 







Aircraft F-14D Aircraft/Wing 14 




Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1982 5.300 7.964 0.000 
1983 6.500 9.422 0.000 
1984 40.600 56.759 0.000 
1985 276.700 375.333 0.000 
1986 347.900 459.537 0.000 
1987 278.700 356.704 92.500 115.684 
1988 7 168.000 207.214 818.800 986.032 
1989 12 152.600 180.678 951.300 1105.740 
1990 24 117.800 134.147 1530.500 1723.330 
1991 12 119.800 131.687 1115.700 1222.868 
1992 115.100 123.858 185.100 198.081 
1993 120.100 125.603 152.000 158.949 
1994 70.900 72.495 0.000 
1995 171.700 171.700 0.000 
Total 55 2413.100 5510.685 










Table 26. F-14D cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 









Aircraft F/A-18E-F                                    Aircraft/Wing                   36 
Service Life 15                                           TAI/Wing                   53.30 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Year Ouantitv             RDT&E                RDT&E                Procurement Procurement o&s 
1975 20.000                  52.598 0.000 
1976 131.200                320.861 0.000 
1977 341.100                766.538 0.000 
1978 625.100                1296.743                    34.200 70.596 
1979 9                   498.600                944.283                    539.900 1011.719 
1980 25                  310.300                533.965                   1119.700 1908.605 
1981 60                  170.900                271.091                   2012.300 3178.396 
1982 63                  194.000                291.499                   2422.200 3605.266 
1983 84                  107.800                 156.260                   2599.500 3702.604 
1984 84                   19.800                  27.680                    2472.300 3407.035 
1985 84                   31.200                  42.322                    2417.100 3231.228 
1986 84                   54.300                  71.724                    2233.000 2891.728 
1987 84                   30.000                  38.397                    2264.700 2832.329 
1988 84                   11.800                   14.554                    2442.100 2940.875 
1989 84                   10.100                   11.958                    2516.400 2924.929 
1990 66                   33.300                  37.921                     1962.300 2209.533 
1991 48                   76.300                  83.871                    1815.600 1989.997 
1992 48                   68.600                  73.820                    2112.000 2260.110 
1993 36                   52.300                  54696                    1334.100 1395.094 
1994 36                   57.300                  58.589                    1736.200 1775.091 
1995 24                   63.400                  63.400                    1167.400 1167.400 
Total 1003                                             5212.770 42502.534 
Average Cost 42.375 
Armualized 
Cost'Aircraft 2.825 2.110 
Armualized 
Cost/Wing 150.581 112.468 
Total Annualized 
Cost/Wing 263.049 
Table 27. F/A-18E/F cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 















Aircraft EA-6B Aircraft/Wing 4 




Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1967 67.400 283.490 0.000 
1968 54.000 219.980 0.000 
1969 4 27.300 107.033 104.800 427.223 
1970 15 23.400 87.227 244.500 960.341 
1971 8 12.000 42.501 194.400 720.125 
1972 12 14.900 50.149 202.800 705.727 
1973 7 5.400 17.132 151.500 485.864 
1974 6 4.000 11.596 120.000 357.066 
1975 6 6.800 17.883 128.700 351.826 
1976 7 0.000 137.600 348.137 
1977 6 0.000 135.500 306.901 
1978 6 5.600 11.617 141.400 291.878 
1979 6 17.300 32.764 173.500 325.122 
1980 6 28.400 48.871 182.000 310.231 
1981 6 9.100 14.435 223.600 353.173 
1982 6 10.700 16.078 275.800 410.508 
1983 6 12.700 18.409 311.000 442.974 
1984 8 23.400 32.713 488.300 672.918 
1985 6 35.800 48.561 389.700 520.959 
1986 12 81.200 107.256 413.800 535.870 
1987 12 50.100 64.122 426.300 533.149 
1988 12 0.000 458.100 551.662 
1989 12 26.100 30.902 555.400 645.567 
Totals 169 1262.720 10257.223 




Cost "Wing 17.973 
Total Annualized 




Table 28. EA-6B cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
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Aircraft S-3 Aircraft/Wing 8 




Year Ouantirv    RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement O&S 
1969 80.600 316.003 0.000 
1970 140.200 522.619 0.000 
1971 264.300 936.082 22.700 84.089 
1972 13         204.200 687.276 372.600 1296.618 
1973 35          38.800 123.093 578.500 1855.265 
1974 45           5.200 15.075 541.100 1610.072 
1975 45 0.000 557.600 1524.305 
1976 41 0.000 503.900 1274.901 
Total 179 2600.148 7645.249 
Average Cost 42.711 
Annualized 
Cost/Aircraft 1.780 3.739 
Annualized 
Cost/Wing 21.080 44.288 
Total Annualized 
Cost/Wing 65.368 
Table 29. S-3 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 









Aircraft E-2C Aircraft/Wing 4 




Year OuantHv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1968 12.500 50.921 0.000 
1969 25.900 101.544 0.000 
1970 66.100 246.399 0.000 
1971 57.500 203.650 44.000 162.991 
1972 11 30.800 103.664 273.900 953.150 
1973 8 13.900 44.098 161.000 516.331 
1974 9 1.400 4.059 158.500 471.625 
1975 6 0.000 124.600 340.618 
1976 7 0.000 186.100 470.845 
1977 6 0.000 156.500 354.465 
1978 6 0.000 196.600 405.822 
1979 6 5.600 10.606 209.100 391.833 
1980 6 11.100 19.101 201.600 343.641 
1981 6 16.800 26.649 240.800 3«0.340 
1982 6 18.100 27.197 262.800 391.158 
1983 6 52.100 75.521 301.800 429.869 
1984 6 50.300 70.320 324.200 446.775 
1985 6 34.400 46.662 334.100 446.632 
1986 6 22.100 29.192 341.800 442.630 
1987 10 32.800 41.980 457.200 571.794 
1988 6 21.700 26.765 389.700 469.292 
1989 6 22.600 26.758 375.600 436.577 
1990 4 40.600 46.234 349.800 393.872 
1991 6 35.700 39.242 431.800 473.277 
1992 6 6.300 6.779 529.000 566.098 
1993 6.400 6.693 94.800 99.134 
1994 18.100 18.507 37.800 38.647 
1995 4 58.800 58.800 338.900 338.900 
Total 143 1331.341 10336.316 
Average Cost 72.282 
Annualized 
Cost Aircraft 4.252 
Annualized 
Cost Wing 25.182 
Total .Annualized 




Table 30. E-2C cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 














Aircraft SH-60B CGTG CVBG 








Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement o&s 
1972 19.100 64.285 0.000 
1973 18.600 59.009 0.000 
1974 9.300 26.961 0.000 
1975 30.000 78.897 0.000 
1976 27.900 68.232 0.000 
1977 72.100 162.027 0.000 
1978 135.900 281.919 0.000 
1979 94.800 179.539 0.000 
1980 178.700 307.507 0.000 
1981 100.800 159.895 105.000 165.846 
1982 18 70.900 106.532 706.700 1051.871 
1983 27 9.000 13.046 797.200 1135.494 
1984 21 7.100 9.926 527.600 727.077 
1985 24 11.300 15.328 421.400 563.336 
1986 18 17.200 22.719 269.800 349.390 
1987 17 18.600 23.806 229.700 287.273 
1988 6 18.400 22.695 136.300 164.138 
1989 6 1.900 2.250 118.500 137.738 
1990 6 9.900 11.274 195.900 220.582 
1991 6 16.600 18.247 177.100 194.111 
1992 13 33.800 36.372 272.300 291.396 
1993 12 34.400 35.976 250.600 262.057 
1994 7 45.300 46.319 197.300 201.720 
Totals 181 1752.759 5752.027 
Average Cost 31.779 
Annualized 
Cost/Aircraft 1.445 2.572 
Annualized CGTG 6.416 11.425 
Cost CVBG 10.694 19.041 
Total Annualized CGTG 17.841 
Cost CVBG 29.735 
Table 31. SH-60B cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 









Aircraft SH-60F Aircraft/Wing 6 




Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1984 18.500 25.863 0.000 
1985 19.100 25.908 0.000 
1986 11.600 15.322 28.400 36.778 
1987 7 4.000 5.120 165.700 207.231 
1988 18 0.000 332.500 400.410 
1989 18 0.000 373.300 433.904 
1990 0.000 111.100 125.098 
1991 18 0.000 281.000 307.991 
1992 18 0.000 254.900 272.776 
1993 12 0.000 165.200 172.753 
1994 9 0.000 42.000 42.941 
1995 0.000 7.600 7.600 
o&s 
Total 100 72.213 2007.481 
Average Cost 20.075 
Annualized 
Cost/Aircraft 0.873 2.649 
Annualized 
Cost/Wing 7.754 23.533 
Total Annualized 
Cost/Wing 31.287 
Table 32. SH-60F cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 










Aircraft CH-46 Aircraft/Wing         2 
Service Life 33 TAJ/Wing          2.96 
Average Average 
Aircraft Frvawav $ Procurements Ratio 
OH-58D 3.756 7.946 2.116 
UH-60 4.671 7.073 1.514 
SH-60B 14.000 26.914 1.922 
SH-60F 10.008 22.920 2.290 
AH-64A 8.800 12.987 1.476 
AH-64D 6.300 8.923 
] 116                               Average Ratio 
AH-1W 4.897 9.994 2.041                                    1-825 
CH-46 3.810 6.953 
O&S 
Annualized 
Cost/Aircraft 0.211 7.929 
Annualized 
Cost/Wing 0.142 23.480 
Total Annualized 
Cost/Wing 23.622 
Table 33. CH-46 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
After Nicholas (U.S. Military Aircraft, 1977-1994). 
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Ship Class AOE6 
Service Life 30 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1985 7.800 10.580 0.000 
1986 4.700 6.208 0.000 
1987 1 1.500 1.920 497.000 621.569 
1988 0.400 0.493 0.000 
1989 1 0.000 362.100 420.886 
1990 1 0.000 395.100 444.879 
1991 2.300 2.528 1.100 1.206 
1992 0.400 0.430 210.000 224.727 













Table 34. AOE-6 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 





Ship Class CG 47 
Service Life 30 
Adjusyed Adjusted 
Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1976 18.800 45.977 0.000 
1977 14.400 32.360 0.000 
1978 1 8.600 17.840 930.000 1919.709 
1979 10.400 19.696 0.000 
1980 1 14.200 24.435 820.000 1397.746 
1981 2 4.100 6.504 1940.500 3064.989 
1982 3 0.000 2927.700 4357.666 
1983 3 3.000 4.349 2972.700 4234.172 
1984 3 1.100 1.538 2971.400 4094.837 
1985 3 36.800 49.918 2795.100 3736.546 
1986 3 35.600 47.024 2505.300 3244.356 
1987 3 25.800 33.021 2753.900 3444.144 
1988 5 110.700 136.539 4182.800 5037.096 
1989 66.200 78.381 0.000 
1990 61.900 70.490 0.000 
1991 99.400 109.263 0.000 
Total 27 677.334 34531.259 
Average Cost 1278.936 
Annualized Cost 42.631 
Total 
Annualized Cost 70.648 
Table 35. CG-47 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 















Ship Class CVN68 
Service Life 45 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Year OuantHv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1978 0.000 268.000 553.207 
1979 0.000 86.000 161.155 
1980 1 0.000 2102.000 3583.002 
1981 1.600 2.538 149.100 235.501 
1982 1.500 2.254 554.500 825.332 
1983 2 1.600 2.319 6506.600 9267.690 
1984 1.000 1.398 11.000 15.159 
1985 1.000 1.356 13.100 17.512 
1986 0.000 0.000 
1987 0.000 52.000 65.033 
1988 2 0.000 6237.000 7510.847 
1989 0.000 151.100 175.631 
1990 0.000 51.300 57.763 
1991 1.800 1.979 14.000 15.345 
1992 8.200 8.824 186.400 199.472 
1993 12.000 12.550 844.100 882.692 
1994 11.500 11.759 1210.800 1237.922 
1995 5.000 5.000 2460.800 2460.800 
Total 5 49.977 27264.063 
Average Cost 5452.813 
Annualized Cost 121.174 
Total 




Table 36. CVN-68 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
After Nicholases. Weapon Systems, 1977-1994). 
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Ship Class DD963 
Service Life 30 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Year Ouantirv     RDT&E     RDT&E     Procurement Procurement       O&S 
1973 0.000          248.800 797.908 
1974 7                               0.000           590.300 1756.469 
1975 7                               0.000           457.100 1249.570 
1976 0.000           646.200 1634.929 
1977 0.000           186.900 423.320 
1978 1                               0.000           383.500 791.622 
1979 0.000            57.800 108.311 
1980 0.000 0.000 
1981 0.000             2.200 3.475 
1982 2.000         3.005             1.200 1.786 
1983 0.000             6.300 8.973 
Total 15                              3.005 6776.364 
Average Cost 451.758         22.352 
Annualized Cost 15.059          22.352 
Total 
Annualized Cost 37.411 
Table 37. DD-963 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 





Ship Class DDG51 
Service Life 30 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Year Ouantitv RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement       O&S 
1981 75.300 119.445 0.000 
1982 0.000 0.000 
1983 138.300 200.470 0.000 
1984 133.100 186.074 79.000 108.869 
1985 1 138.200 187.463 976.000 1304.736 
1986 101.400 133.938 70.400 91.168 
1987 2 91.300 116.853 1730.400 2164.111 
1988 105.300 129.878 10.400 12.524 
1989 4 37.200 44.045 2791.600 3244.807 
1990 5 105.300 119.912 3529.400 3974.073 
1991 4 101.000 111.022 3175.600 3480.632 
1992 5 92.500 99.538 4013.800 4295.279 
1993 4 110.500 115.563 3350.800 3503.997 
1994 3 102.600 104.909 2724.700 2785.733 
1995 3 91.600 91.600 2834.600 2834.600 
Total 31 1760.711 27800.529 
Average Cost 896.791         20.709 
Annualized Cost 29.893          20.709 
Total 
Annualized Cost 50.602 
Table 38. DDG-51 cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
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Missile Tomahawk 
Service Life 10 
Adjusted Adjusted 
Year Quantity       RDT&E RDT&E Procurement Procurement 
1973 4.000 12.690 0.000 
1974 2.300 6.668 0.000 
1975 37.300 98.095 0.000 
1976 130.700 319.638 0.000 
1977 119.500 268.547 0.000 
1978 208.500 432.524 0.000 
1979 154.100 291.845 0.000 
1980 6              104.800 180.340 30.200 51.478 
1981 50             133.900 212.400 190.000 300.102 
1982 61             144.500 217.122 232.600 346.208 
1983 51             109.000 157.999 221.300 315.209 
1984 124            128.600 179.783 341.700 470.891 
1985 180            71.900 97.530 581.000 776.692 
1986 249             59.500 78.593 692.300 896.526 
1987 324            77.300 98.935 735.100 919.347 
1988 475            46.300 57.107 857.200 1032.275 
1989 510            56.600 67.014 696.000 808.993 
1990 400             16.600 18.904 692.300 779.524 
1991 648             12.200 13.411 1074.000 1177.163 
1992 176 0.000 427.100 457.052 
1993 200 0.000 426.100 445.581 
1994 216 0.000 263.000 268.891 
1995 217 0.000 305.300 305.300 
Total 3887 2809.144 9351.232 
Average Cost 2.406 
Annualized Cost 0.241 
Table 39. Tomahawk cost breakdown in millions of FY 95 dollars. 
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